The list of “Telecommunications Fraud Key Areas” should be

Since 2015, the 23 member units of the State Council's Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Combating the Telecommunication Network's New Fraud and Crimes (referred to as the Joint Conference) have been led by the Ministry of Public Security to further promote the special campaign against telecommunications fraud and achieved remarkable results. Up to now, there are a total of 18 key areas of telecom fraud that have been listed and reorganized, and 5 of them have been delisted.
 

Five key areas of telecommunications network fraud crimes, such as Fengning County in Hebei Province and Yugan County in Jiangxi Province, have actually been delisted at the end of last year. But on the second anniversary of the Xu Yuyu case, such news is still gratifying.
 

The evil of telecom fraud, no need to rumor. Some telecommunications fraud high-income areas are listed as key remediation areas, not to label these places, but to reflect the governance strategies of different priorities and precise exertions, and also correspond to the regional characteristics of telecom fraud. Judging from the current progress, the first phase of governance has started from 2015. A total of 12 places have been included in the key remediation. After nearly two years of rectification, five key areas have been delisted, indicating that the previous stage of governance has been effective.
 

However, telecom fraud has the characteristics of flow action cases and has certain intransigence. This determines that the relevant governance must be continuous and dynamic, and it should not be relaxed. Therefore, at the end of last year, while delisting the five regions in the first phase of remediation, six key remediation areas were added. This kind of retreat and retreat is not only affirmation of the effectiveness of some local governance in the early stage, but also avoiding slack in those places that have not been included in the key remediation.
 

The remaining 13 listed rectification areas have also made a lot of progress. For example, in the first half of this year, 7 people involved in the case of Changsha “2·12” telecom fraud in Fujian were arrested; from January to July this year, 42 criminal cases of telecom fraud in Luchuan County, Guangxi were filed, 2 gangs were destroyed, and captured. The suspect is 24 people. It can be expected that a new listing rectification area will soon be delisted.
 

Of course, delisting does not mean that a place where telecommunications fraud can be rectified can stop the flag, it is more affirmation of the effectiveness of the previous stage of governance. After being delisted, the places involved should still learn from the experience and lessons learned from the special actions, and guide the local telecom fraud governance to normalization to prevent the resurgence; the relevant departments may also implement a “review” for listing rectification, and track the effect of delisting areas. Feedback, to avoid some delisting places to relax vigilance, mistakenly believe that the card is all right.
 

It is undeniable that being included in the key rectification areas of telecommunications fraud is not a glorious thing for the places involved. But to get rid of this "hat", it is only to carry out the telecommunications fraud governance to the end, to speak with practical actions and governance effects. There is no reason to be unconcerned in areas that have not been included in the key remediation. It is important to know that the probability of occurrence of telecom fraud cases is directly related to the size of public governance. Once the governance level is neglected, it may provide a hotbed for telecom fraud.
 

The special action against telecommunications fraud has focused on rectifying some places, and it is essentially the inherent requirement of chaos. The results are also obvious: the data released by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology shows that the number of fraudulent telephone reports received by the 12321 Reporting Center has continued to decline. In Beijing, for example, the total number of Beijing Telecom fraud cases in 2017 was the lowest in five years. It can be said that the high momentum of telecommunication network fraud has been initially contained.
 

In addition to recognition, it is still necessary to tighten the string of governance. The delisting of the five key regions marks a phased outcome of telecommunications governance, which can be hampered by the high liquidity, fission and continual change of telecom fraud, and the high-pressure situation against telecommunications fraud must remain unsettled. From special rectification to normalization and institutionalized governance, from palliative to the root cause, so that the society generally bid farewell to telecom fraud, we still need to make persistent efforts.